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Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a 
culture that tries to skip it will never grow up. 
Thomas Nagel (1989, p. 12) 
1. Introduction
One of the main issues in ecophilosophy in our contemporary situation seems
to be the translation of knowledge about possible dangers into political and
social realities. Messages concerning the perils and risks of climate change and
other environmental threats seem to be already wide spread. Whoever wants to
listen and be informed can find a lot of information about the troublesome
predicament of our planet. At the same time we seem to be lacking the
motivation and determination to apply known solutions and strategies. In this
paper, I would like to argue that we actually need more discussions and greater
focus on the exchange of opinions, rather than focusing on action. I claim we
need to search for the philosophical justifications of our approaches, even if
this could be seen as distraction from our main problems. Why would we try to
save roses while the forest is on fire? If I am right, it is the very lack of roses
that has left us with a burning forest. This will be shown through the example
of Thomas Nagel’s typology of good, moral and rational life, but before I
describe his classification, I would like to point to our awareness of climate
change.
2. Climate Change Consciousness
We have recently heard Leonardo DiCaprio advocate collective action against
climate change during his Oscar ceremony speech:
Making The Revenant was about man's relationship to the natural 
world. A world that we collectively felt in 2015 as the hottest year 
in recorded history. Our production needed to move to the 
southern tip of this planet just to be able to find snow. Climate 
change is real, it is happening right now. It is the most urgent 
threat facing our entire species, and we need to work collectively 
together and stop procrastinating. We need to support leaders 
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around the world who do not speak for the big polluters, but who 
speak for all of humanity, for the indigenous people of the world, 
for the billions and billions of underprivileged people out there 
who would be most affected by this. For our children’s children, 
and for those people out there whose voices have been drowned 
out by the politics of greed. I thank you all for this amazing award 
tonight. Let us not take this planet for granted (Griffits 2016). 
The audience of this show, which exceeded 30 million people (see: Kissell 
2016) not counting news coverage and retweeting and any other forms of 
reception, will have had a chance to hear Leonardo DiCaprio’s contribution to 
the climate change debate. The moment of “Leonardo DiCaprio winning his 
first Oscar after six nominations” was one of the moments receiving highest 
attention from viewers (see: Baysinger 2016). So far, so good? Many people got 
to know about the problem of climate change. Perhaps they will be influenced 
by DiCaprio’s words and change their attitude as well as put some pressure on 
politicians in order to change policies affecting the environment. This could 
help reduce the rate of global warming and potentially address other 
environmental issues. 
The problem is that the context in which this message was given is also 
important for its impact. This context was not environmentally friendly. An 
Oscar ceremony is an occasion to sell advertisements and numerous firms are 
spending a lot of money to persuade viewers to their products. Cars were 
heavily advertised during the show. This reveals one of the reasons why we 
have a problem with climate change today. Put simply, the audience got an 
incoherent message. – “consume more” from ads and “consume less” or 
actually let's force big polluters to pollute less from DiCaprio speech. Although I 
do not want to underestimate the influence of such speeches, the problem is not 
the way they are formulated but rather the context in which we are perceiving 
them.  
The message about the vulnerability of our planet, as well as the 
required behavioral changes, is also one of the main topics of Pope Francis’ 
encyclical letter Laudatio Si. Just one quote showing how deeply the message of 
this text is connected with ecophilosophical thought: 
If we approach nature and the environment without this 
openness to awe and wonder, if we no longer speak the language 
of fraternity and beauty in our relationship with the world, our 
attitude will be that of masters, consumers, ruthless exploiters, 
unable to set limits on their immediate needs. By contrast, if we 
feel intimately united with all that exists, then sobriety and care 
will well up spontaneously. The poverty and austerity of Saint 
Francis were no mere veneer of asceticism, but something much 
more radical: a refusal to turn reality into an object simply to be 
used and controlled (Pope Francis 2015). 
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If this is not enough to convince us of the urgency of taking action and 
saving the planet, you can read books by scientists, who are also concerned 
about the current situation (Rees 2003) or political scientists and philosophers 
writing about the possible consequences of genetic engineering. 
3. Rational, Moral and Good Life
In The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel describes the division between three
aspects or forms of our obligations. One of the aspects would be the answer to
the question of what would be rational to do; the second would be the answer
to the question what we ought to do in a moral sense, what it would be good to
do; the third provides us with the understanding of what we should do in order
to preserve our lifestyle, way of life, the world-view we believe in, etc. (Nagel
1989, pp. 189-207). The last one quite often also translates into the answer to
what we would do if we simply pay attention to our own particular interests as
individuals. However, if we care about the interests of others it can already be
moral, as well as rational, conduct and the establishment of a conception of a
moral/rational life, which may and may not be in accordance with our concept
of 'good life'.
Does it therefore seem that all three aspects of the good life and our 
obligations should be working in one direction - taking action in order to 
prevent climate change? The Pope describes to us what moral life would look 
like. Similarly (for those on the other side of the ethical spectrum) Peter Singer 
provides us with a textbook of our moral obligations criticizing our lack of 
empathy and unwillingness to help others (Singer 2010). DiCaprio confirms 
the conception of the good life and provides us with a role model, which could 
provide us with motivation for changing our lifestyles. Alternatively, Rees 
provides us with rational arguments for our responsible action, showing the 
looming dangers of scientific over-development, natural disasters and bad 
political choices. If we are all so well informed, why do we seem not to be 
acting accordingly? 
4. Motivation Issues
At the same time many thinkers claim that the urgency of demands for action
and the disastrous future which we may be forced to face (unless we take
drastic steps to avoid it) is not having the impact we might expect. As Anthony
Giddens puts it:
Attitude surveys show that most of the public accept that global 
warming is a major threat; yet only a few are willing to alter their 
lives in any significant way as a result. Among elites, climate 
change lends itself to gestural politics – grandiose-sounding plans 
largely empty of content (Giddens 2009, p. 2). 
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Both Giddens (2009, p. 3) and Naomi Klein (2014, pp. 9-50) are 
searching for possible explanations for our, and our politicians, idleness in 
addressing the dangers posed by climate change. Also Peter Singer provides a 
series of common excuses justifying not helping others, which can be easily 
redeployed in the context of ignoring challenges of climate change (Singer 
2010, pp. 23-62). Those range from bringing up the claims of those climate 
scientists who are denying human impact on temperature level and thus 
presenting the issue as disputable; to ignoring the issue by stating that the 
individual change does not have much of an impact or/and would be unfair, 
since others are not changing; as well as to postponing the effort, because we 
are habituated to the current state of affairs and our usual overestimation of 
pleasures available now in comparison with those of the future.  
Having said this, the abovementioned authors disagree about the 
measures which need to be taken. According to Singer we need to concentrate 
on individual effort and determination of particular people, whose action will 
add up, helping the poor escape poverty and providing them with necessary 
resources in order to cope. Singer claims that we cannot rely on political 
actions due to powerful interest groups, which can make standard political 
mechanisms for reform obsolete. He names an example of a political battle over 
food subsidies and trade barriers, which was lost in Congress (even though 
Bush used his veto power to try to make it happen (Singer 2010, p. 114).  
Singer's conception relies on rational arguments and a utilitarian 
ethical conception. In my interpretation, according to Singer the main issue 
remains the same as one of the crucial issues in the eyes of John Stuart Mill – 
our pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of suffering should be understood in 
connection with other sentient beings. Therefore, the same factors which make 
us concerned with our pleasure and suffering should be universalized so as to 
include all people, as well as other beings able to feel pleasure and to suffer. He 
also thinks that our motivation to help others is unimportant compared to the 
effects of our actions (Singer 2010, pp. 66–67).  
Thus if we go back to Nagel and his conception of the relationships 
between good, moral and rational life, he describes a position which seems to 
be very close to Singer's proposition: 
Someone who finds himself convinced of the truth of a morality 
that makes impossible demands on him – such as utilitarianism if 
he is an affluent individual in a world of extreme inequality – may 
be able by a leap of self-transcendence to change his life so 
radically from the inside that service to this morality – to the 
welfare of mankind or of all sentient beings – becomes his 
overwhelming concern and his dominant good. This might be 
either a personal choice or something that he thinks everyone 
should do: a demand of human transformation (Nagel 1989, p. 
206).  
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Singer seems to foster both attitudes – asking us to commit ourselves to 
donating a bigger share of our income as a matter of personal choice, whilst at 
the same time searching for arguments which would allow the promotion of 
changes in culture and moral expectations, such that it would be a part of our 
moral obligation to give our share to charity (Singer 2010, pp. 154-169). This 
seems to be inadequate in the context of the challenges before us. The 
individual choice, lacking political support, not only may be not enough, but 
still needs some instances in order to coordinate our efforts. We should search 
for convergences (as Giddens would say) ensuing a more coherent attitude 
towards public policies. Therefore I think that avoiding the political side of our 
life and underestimating social stage seems to be a weakness of Singer's 
conception. 
Giddens on the other hand tries to persuade us to accept gradual 
changes in policies and taxes, which will allow us to avoid bringing the problem 
of climate change into contemporary political conflicts. Giddens believes that 
staying away from rivalries between different sides of the political spectrum 
will help to keep the best practices of coping with climate change, even if the 
given political party will lose power. If the negotiations of climate policies 
include all factions, they will not depend on popular support, which can change 
quite abruptly. Another point he makes is stressing difficulties in keeping the 
public eager to act on their knowledge about climate change. If we would try to 
apply Nagel’s conception to Giddens’ attitude, it seems that for him the most 
important aspects are those connected with rational choices. People should 
have a frame for their action which will enable a compromise between 
economic development and concern for the climate. At the same time, 
according to Giddens, problems may arise from using too much ethical 
argumentation, as well as expecting too much in terms of lifestyle changes. 
Therefore, in Nagel's terms, that which is good to do and moral to do should be 
rather seen with caution and the most we can expect from bringing rational 
arguments. This also can be seen when he ends with technological optimism 
and sees one of the opportunities to cope with climate change in development 
of new devices and energy sources (Giddens 2009, pp. 114, 116, 149, 230).  
We could say that Giddens makes interesting points in his struggle to 
achieve bipartisan support for policies, but I would defend a position already 
presented by Alexis de Tocqueville: “There is no country in the world in which 
everything can be provided for by the laws, or in which political institutions can 
prove a substitute for common sense and public morality" (2003, p. 101). In 
other words we really need to make climate change a part of our political and 
social life, otherwise we may end up only paying lip service to the whole 
problem, whereas the will and motivation won't be present. As I tried to show 
above, the rhetorical aspect of the presence of global problems seems to be 
already there, 
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[H]owever, to move beyond rhetoric means deciding between
those industries and activities that are sustainable and those that
are not. Such a decision cannot be left to individual transactions
and personal morality. In a world of uneven consumption
patterns, sustainable development raises major questions of
international distribution (Low 2003, p. 1).
In order to decide about such issues we need to have methods for 
conflict resolution and discussion platforms. Making climate change an issue 
outside of political camps will make it harder to question old ways and develop 
new ones, whereas with the passage of time, our knowledge will also change. 
Keeping it only a question of rational life (going again back to Nagel 
categories) will be harmful, among other factors, because we are not always 
inclined to do what is rational. Moral and 'good' life perspectives can be useful 
for expanding our motivational basis.  
5. VW As a Nietzschean Liar
I believe that the changes which are needed include the way we discuss with
each other, avoiding the instrumentalization of political, moral and social
aspects of our actions, beliefs and commitments. We can easily show examples
of corporations using public relations methods in order to assert their
commitment to ecological goals and challenges while at the same time playing
dirty with existing ecological norms and regulations. This festival of hypocrisy,
which includes the BP spill in the Mexican Gulf and VW’s scandal about
emissions as very vivid examples, is undermining trust among different social
actors and endangers not only our responses to climate change, but also the
very basis of mutual understanding. Even if we do not share Kantian repulsion
towards lying, we need still be concerned about such situations. Moreover,
according to the Nietzschean view on lying from an extra-moral perspective,
such cases are examples of unacceptable lying – the situation when we allow
others make us believe in something which is not there.
The liar is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in 
order to make something which is unreal appear to be real. He 
says, for example, “I am rich,” when the proper designation for his 
condition would be “poor.” He misuses fixed conventions by 
means of arbitrary substitutions or even reversals of names. If he 
does this in a selfish and moreover harmful manner, society will 
cease to trust him and will thereby exclude him. What men avoid 
by excluding the liar is not so much being defrauded as it is being 
harmed by means of fraud. Thus, even at this stage, what they 
hate is basically not deception itself, but rather the unpleasant, 
hated consequences of certain sorts of deception. It is in a 
similarly restricted sense that man now wants nothing but truth: 
he desires the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth 
(Nietzsche 1993, p. 81). 
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How can we rely on negotiations with social actors, who are not telling 
the truth even from the point of view of Nietzsche? A similar problem can be 
seen in discussions about realizing values by European Union institutions.1 We 
can see that moral ideals are used in order to justify interests and lifestyle 
choices. In this context we need philosophy in order to remind ourselves about 
the difficult relationship between different categories of values and in order to 
resist compromising moral ideals in accordance with the instrumental attitude 
of many social actors. 
6. Why Should We Be Moral and Not Only Good Or Rational?
Above mentioned situations, as well as problems with the justification of
different moral categories and values, leads some philosophers to deny the
important function of philosophy, to maintain that philosophers are losing
themselves in rhetorical labyrinths. According to Richard Rorty, justifying our
actions should be much simpler:
But one will take the question “Why should I be moral?” seriously 
only if one thinks that the answer “Because you might not be able 
to live with yourself if you thought yourself immoral” is not good 
enough. But why should it not suffice? Only, it seems to me, 
because the person who doubts that she should be moral is 
already in the process of cobbling together a new identity for 
herself – one that does not commit her to doing the thing that her 
old identity took to be obligatory (Rorty 2007, p. 197). 
Here, in Nagel's categories, we can see a domination of the ‘good life’ 
attitude. However, it is not so hard to imagine many contexts in which ‘good life’ 
will be in conflict with a moral and/or rational life. I can consume a lot and, in 
doing so, have an impression of following a proper ideal of ‘good life’ while at 
the same time putting a lot of pressure on the climate and the environment. If I 
am an individual this may be seen as unproblematic, as my impact is limited, 
and yet this is not the case, since different attitudes towards the relationship 
between what is good, what is moral and what is rational, concern almost 
everyone. My personal choice influences the general attitude and adds up with 
other individuals and their choices. In effect we can have a lot of people 
1 “Larger countries delegated values-based policy to Brussels while they got on with the 
hard stuff, such as security or access to oil. For every pious expression of support for 
international justice or condemnation of capital punishment, there was a shabby 
energy deal or quiet support for a useful dictator. Some feel this category includes the 
Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline” (The Economist 2016a, p. 22). Not to mention situation in 
the US, where “in 2015 the Supreme Court reprimanded it [Environmental Protection 
Agency] for regulating mercury, arsenic and other substances emitted by power plants 
without taking proper account of the costs” and at the same time for 2017 Pentagon 
requested budget of 528.7 billion dollars (The Economist 2016b, p. 36-37). 
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believing in having a 'good life' and not seeing that the planet is endangered as 
a result of their choices, not in spite of them. Again, philosophy seems to be a 
good place to search for balance between different attitudes in this respect.  
In this context we should mention dangers from another side of the 
philosophical spectrum. Some people, when confronted with discussions and 
misunderstandings about philosophical issues, try to avoid them by saying that 
there should be one conception of reality, such as the scientific one, and that 
there we can find answers to our concerns. This sometimes leads towards 
attempts to diminish the role of ethics, by saying it should be naturalized 
(which will again leave us without moral life and only with 'good life' and 
rational life): 
a purely naturalistic account of anything, including morality, 
leaves out of the field of its vision the world of subjective and 
interpersonal existence. The result is that scientific naturalism, at 
least as I have understood the term in this book, sees only a world 
without subjects as the real world. It is constrained then to 
interpret all subjective phenomena as ghostly intrusions or as 
having no reality at all. And if subjects seem to have little or no 
reality, then this can easily be taken to mean that they have little 
or no value either (Haught 2006, p. 156). 
Similar concerns were expressed in connection with techno-science 
and its possible destructive influence on moral aspects of our lives: 
science has played an important and often crucial role in exposing 
environmental damage and aiding opposition to it. But modern 
techno-science also has an uglier but less remarked face: techno-
science has contributed to producing the environmental crisis at 
least as much as to curing it, applying to highly complex 
situations and systems specialized and highly instrumentally-
directed forms of knowledge whose aim is to maximize outputs, 
often with devastating results (Plumwood 2005, p. 38). 
As we can see the situation in which we consider only some aspects of 
our existence can lead to problematic situations. By letting ourselves 
concentrate on what is rational, or by unreflectively pursuing our lifestyle, we 
deprive ourselves of critical thinking tools, which can be helpful in the search 
for motivation and methods of changing our behaviours in order to avoid 
climate catastrophe.  
All the viewpoints criticized in this paper seem to have one thing in 
common – they imply that the method of taking care of the best possible life is 
already invented and only needs interpretation of some rules and values in a 
new background of climate change. Whereas we may assume that newness of 
our situation is sufficiently great that we still need to work on our tools of 
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understanding and that only after forging them we will be able to find new 
answers to climate change. Quoting Nagel: 
Too much time is wasted because of the assumption that methods 
already in existence will solve problems for which they were not 
designed; too many hypotheses and systems of thought in 
philosophy and elsewhere are based on the bizarre view that we, 
at this point in history, are in possession of the basic forms of 
understanding needed to comprehend absolutely anything. I 
believe that the methods needed to understand ourselves do not 
yet exist (Nagel 1989, p. 10). 
A reflection on the relationship between 'good', moral and rational life, 
conveys one of the points to be taken into consideration, while searching for a 
way to respond to contemporary environmental challenges.     
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Being Good, Moral and Rational in a Context of Climate Change 
Abstract. Climate change has become a popular topic with a strong presence 
in media, political, scientific and ethical debates. This raises a question as to 
why we are not acting in accordance with our knowledge and are unable 
to do enough to protect our future. The paper argues that the problem partly 
arises from a lack of philosophical reflection about relations between different 
aspects of our personalities. Those different aspects are presented based 
on the reflections of Thomas Nagel on good, moral, and rational ways of 
life. I claim that all three need to be taken into consideration in order to 
answer challenge raised by the environmental dangers we are facing. 
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